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Abstract

U.S. state social spending has increased both as a percentage of national GDP and a
percentage of the national budget since 1960. Growth in spending across states, however, has not
been uniform. Those advocating for more conservative spending argue that large social
expenditure budgets dampen the growth of society as a whole. In this paper, I examine the effect
that state social spending has on the growth rate of personal income per capita. I follow the
model proposed by Peter Lindert (2004), who studied the relationship between social spending
and economic growth at the national level. I examine the period from 1990 to 2007 and consider
social spending and personal income data for all 50 U.S. states. I find that the level of state social
spending has no effect on personal income growth, a conclusion which agrees with Lindert. This
result suggests that state governments could invest more money in social programs at no cost to
the mean income of its populace. After exploring the relationship between social spending and
personal income per capita, I consider whether governments have an obligation to spend money
on social programs by reviewing three perspectives: Robert Nozick, John Rawls, and the
Catholic Church. Nozick thinks that governments have no obligation to spend money on social
programs, even if doing so would benefit society economically. The other two perspectives,
however, hold that social spending is obligatory, regardless of how it affects the economic wellbeing of society. These perspectives show that the decision to redistribute money isn’t solely
based on economic outcomes.
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Introduction

One important reason why governments spend money is to correct market failures, or
equilibrium outcomes that aren’t socially optimal. This type of spending usually subsidizes
positive externalities such as education, in which case the government judges that the optimal
level of education is much higher than the market would produce on its own. Money that is
devoted directly to the development of social welfare is called social spending, and adjudicating
how to finance and dispense such spending gives rise to heated congressional debates every year.
But what effect does social spending really have on the economy?
This first goal of this paper is to answer this question using econometric analysis. In
section 1, I summarize past research into international social spending and economic growth,
before analyzing previous attempts to delineate a relationship between state social spending and
economic growth. In section 2, I give a brief historical overview of social spending in the last
250 years. In section 3, I explain my methodology. I follow the same approach and use the same
model as Peter Lindert (2004), who conducted a similar investigation into the effect social
spending habits have on growth at the national level. In this section I will also discuss the
specific ways in which my work differs from Lindert’s. In section 4, I present the results of my
statistical analysis. I test the hypothesis that social spending has no effect on economic growth,
as measured by a change in personal income, by utilizing data from the U.S. Census Bureau.
After my empirical investigation, I take up my second goal to determine whether there is
a moral obligation to help the less fortunate through social spending. In pursuit of an answer, I
review three schools of ethical thought and how each understands obligations—or lack thereof—
to help the less fortunate. The three sources I examine are John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and the
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Catholic Church. I chose them because they are prominent voices in discussions involving social
obligations, discussions which underlie social spending policy. After describing the views of
each source, I compare and contrast them to reveal their strengths and weaknesses. Then I
elucidate their standpoints on whether social spending is obligatory. I conclude by sharing my
beliefs on the subject. I submit that there is an obligation to redistribute wealth via social
spending, and that the reasoning behind this obligation is rooted in the work of John Rawls and
Catholic social teaching.
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Part I

1. Literature Review: Social Spending and Economic Growth

The four primary components of social spending are education, public welfare and
unemployment benefits, Social Security, and public health spending. In any given year, social
spending typically makes up three-quarters of state-level budgets.1 In this section, I will first
review past attempts to explain the relationship between social spending and economic growth
across countries, then explore what has been said about this topic with respect to spending across
U.S. states.
There has been much discussion about the effect social spending has on economic
growth. Proponents of increased social spending say that, on the whole, it improves the wellbeing of society and reduces unhealthy inequality, whose long-term effects they claim undermine
economic well-being. Opponents argue that it diminishes incentives to work, leaves people
dependent on the government for assistance, and slows overall growth. A third group argues that
a change in social spending has no discernable effect on the rate at which an economy grows.
Historical responses to this question at a national level are ambivalent. Both Korpi (1985)
and McCallum and Blaise (1987) found a positive relationship between social spending and
economic growth. However, they are limited in their scope, having restricted their attention to 17
OECD countries. Fölster and Henrekson (1998) examined 23 OECD countries during a later
period from 1970-1995 and concluded that increased social spending negatively affects

1

U.S. Census Bureau. January 1, 2015. Accessed January 14, 2015. http://www.census.gov/.
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economic growth. Some economists are doubtful about the conclusions Fölster and Henrekson
reach. A year later, Agell et al published a paper in response, which corrected for what they
claimed were econometric errors, and found no relationship between social spending and
economic growth.2 Both papers, however, contained two features which make their conclusions
less relevant to the question I’m trying to answer: 1) they considered only wealthy countries, and
2) they used taxes as a proxy for government social spending.
Using taxes instead of expenditure as an independent variable is an entirely different
exercise and often yields different results. If a consumer’s income decreases, as is the case with
the income tax, he or she will have less money to spend on goods and services. The decrease in
consumption will curtail the growth of the economy. Moreover, if a consumer’s dollar doesn’t go
as far, as is the case with a sales tax, then he or she will consume less, and the same conclusion is
reached. Considering social spending instead of taxes tells a different story. Governments may
invest in areas like education, which have been shown to have long-lasting benefits for society.
Even oft-ridiculed sources of social spending like welfare and unemployment compensation are
shown to have positive effects on economic growth in the long run.3 Lastly, even if a government
runs a balanced budget, taxes don’t equal social spending, as the latter is but one component of
total government spending.
Finally, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) found a negative relationship between social
spending and economic growth. Unlike Korpi (1985) and McCallum and Blaise (1987), their
scope includes a comprehensive list of 53 countries. Yet, their paper, too, masks social spending
with taxes. However, there are works that have explored the true relationship between social

Agell, Jonas et all 1998. “Growth and the Public Sector: A Reply,” European Journal of Political Economy 15:
359-366.
2

3

Ostry, Jonathan et al 2014. “Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth,” International Monetary Fund, SDN/14/02.

Heitzig 8
spending and economic growth. Peter Lindert’s two-volume work Growing Public (2004),
examines social spending data across forty OECD countries. Peter Lindert belongs to the third
group that finds no relationship between social spending and economic growth, concluding that
changes in social spending in these countries over much of the second half of the twentieth
century had no significant effect on GDP growth.
Would Lindert’s central finding hold true for the fifty U.S. states? Past findings suggest a
negative relationship between state social spending and economic growth. Becsi (1996)
considers the period from 1961 to 1992 and concludes that state taxes have a negative impact on
growth. Moreover, Reed (2008) examines a later period from 1970-1999 and also finds that state
taxes that fund, in general, any kind of expenditure have a negative impact on economic growth
as measured by state income. Yet, again, taxes are not tantamount to growth, even at the state
level. And as Held (1985) points out, “Taxes cannot be studied in isolation. To the extent that tax
revenues are devoted to the provision of public services… a state may encourage economic
activity within its borders with appropriate expenditures.”4 In other words, one cannot truly
evaluate the efficacy of a tax without considering the purpose for which the revenues it generates
are used. Social spending and its components are useful because they identify a clear source of
the spending and the exact amount of money devoted to it. Because they focus on taxes, Becsi
(1996) and Reed (2008) don’t offer a relevant response to the question I seek to answer.
To date, there have been few if any investigations into the true effects of increased U.S.
state social spending on economic growth. Chernick (2010) considers social spending, but his
model focuses more on relative redistribution across states and whether the financial

4

Agell, Jonas et all 1998.
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redistribution figures of neighboring states impacts the spending of habits of a given state.5 No
paper has applied Lindert’s framework to U.S. states. That’s what I will do in this paper.
While past findings don’t point to a clear answer, Figure 1 sheds some light on the
relationship between state social spending and economic growth. The individual points reflect
social spending and personal income values for states between 1990 and 2007. Moving from left
to right, one notices no discernable trend in the data (correlation coefficient of -0.03); personal
income growth does not change with an increase in per capita social spending. For this reason, I
will test the hypothesis that there is no relationship between U.S. state social spending and
personal income growth using data using data I collected.

Figure 16

Chernick, Howard 2010. “Redistribution at the State and Local Level: Consequences for Economic Growth,”
Public Finance Review 38(4), 409-449.
5

6

U.S. Census Bureau
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Before discussing the data in Figure 1, the methodology of my data analysis, and
subsequent results, I will first present a brief history of social spending to set the scene. It is
difficult to put any conclusions into perspective without first being conscious of the history
which gave rise to the current spending habits of state governments.

2. History

Before the twentieth century, the U.S. allocated very little money to social spending and,
in particular, welfare.7 Instead, the poor were primarily supported through charities run by
churches. In Britain, the Poor Law Reform of 1834 began to change how countries engaged the
poor. Increasingly, nations like the U.S. instead turned to government factions to distribute
welfare. They relied on “indoor” benefits, which required those eligible for welfare to work in
poor houses to receive remunerations.8 Prior to the reform, the impoverished received subsidies
or credits without having to maintain some form of employment.
In the 19th century, the U.S. had great income and wealth inequality, much greater than
they are at the present. Like England, the U.S. devoted a sizable portion of its social expenditure
on poverty relief. Unlike England, however, the U.S. drastically increased its spending on public
education during this time. The effect was astonishing. By 1880, the U.S. had a primary school
enrollment rate of 90.6 percent, a full 9 percentage points above second-place France.9 The U.S.,
however, did not spend very much on social programs outside of education and poverty relief. In

7

Lindert, Peter. 2004. Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century. Vol 1.
New York: Cambridge Press.
8
Lindert 2004
9
Ibid
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1880, U.S. social spending was just 0.29 percent of its GDP, a figure which was equal to the
median of countries which are now OECD members. 10 In fact, U.S. social spending has
remained at or below the median ever since. Global social spending as a percentage of GDP has
increased every decade since 1880.11 The U.S. followed this trend too, but did so at a much
slower rate than the rest of the world.
So why has U.S. social spending increased absolutely and as a percentage of GDP since
the eighteenth century? There were a number of contributing factors. First, the dramatic increase
in life expectancy heightened the need for public pensions. Especially in the twentieth century,
people were living longer, and a greater portion of the population qualified for public pensions.
Second, minorities in the U.S. gained more rights and representation on their behalf during this
period. Before the late 1800s, enslaved blacks and women couldn’t vote, and therefore couldn’t
politically support spending policies that would alleviate their poverty. Third, the Great
Depression left people uneasy about their future. To assuage their anxiety, they invested in
insurance programs which would obviate the next financial disaster from befalling them.12 From
1930 (three years before the New Deal) to 1960 (four years before the Great Society), U.S. social
spending increased from 0.56 percent of GDP to 7.26 percent.13 These trends and the resulting
investments improved the living conditions of many of those in the industrialized world.14
Since 1960, U.S. state social spending per capita has increased as a percentage of real
GDP and as a percentage of the national budget. This is partly due to the federal government’s
increased focus on the state governments’ unique ability to remedy the social issues of the

10

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. January 1, 2015. Accessed January 14, 2015.
http://www.oecd.org/.
11
Ibid
12

Lindert 2004.
www.oecd.org.
14
Lindert 2004.
13
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citizens it represents. Increasingly, the federal government is allowing states the freedom to
expand or modify federal programs to fit the needs of their populaces. Hence, government
transfers have also increased over this time period. But how effective are state governments at
spending these extra resources on social endeavors? In the next section, I describe how I will
answer this question using empirical analysis.

3. Methodology

To investigate what effect state social spending has on economic growth, I will follow the
approach of Lindert (2004). He assumes that there is a nonlinear relationship between GDP
growth and social spending. He considers the quadratic and cubic forms of social spending.
Anticipating heteroskedasticity, he runs a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression. His
regression equations aren’t based on any theoretical model. Instead, he includes “familiar
determinants of the level or growth of GDP,” that is, nonhuman and human capital,
macroeconomic factors like the inflation rate and unemployment rate, and lagged variables to
capture the effect of past capital investments and GDP.
Economic theory suggests that GDP and social spending interact simultaneously with one
another, that is, GDP can explain the variation in social spending and social spending can explain
the variation in GDP. To correct for this, Lindert uses two-stage least squares estimation to
isolate the impact GDP might have on social spending. In the first stage, he predicts social
spending using its traditional determinants and the determinants of GDP. In the second stage, he
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regresses the log of GDP growth on the predicted cubic form of social spending. His regression
equation is summarized as follows:

Log (GDP / CapitaGrowth)  B0  B1Sspenˆding  B2 Sspenˆdingg2  B3 Sspenˆding3  B4 X  u
where
X  a 0  a GDPshortfall  a 2 Capital  a 3 Capitalten a 4 Enrollment
 a 5UnivEnrollment  a 6 Demandsshocks  a 7 Supplyshocks

GDP/CapitaGrowth is the growth rate of per capita GDP. GDPshortfall is the per capita GDP of
the economy ten years earlier, measured in real dollars, Capital is the investment per capita in
the previous year, Capitalten is the investment per capita ten years earlier, Enrollment is the
primary and secondary school enrollment, and UnivEnrollment is the university enrollment ten
years earlier. Lindert defines demand shocks as inflation less unemployment, and supply shocks
as inflation plus unemployment. He defines Sspending as the aggregate of education spending,
social security spending, public health spending, and welfare, unemployment compensation, and
housing subsidies. Sspeˆnding is the predicted value of social spending, which Lindert uses as an
instrumental variable to correct for endogeneity. Every social spending variable is measured in
real dollars per person.
When applying Lindert’s methodology to the fifty states, several problems arise. Primary
and secondary enrollment rates are homogenous across the states and across time: every state had
close to 100 percent primary and secondary enrollment each year. For this reason, I drop them
from my model and only include the university enrollment, which is not homogenous across
states. I could not find university enrollment data before 1990, which limited the scope of my
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regression. As noted above, Lindert defines supply shocks as the sum of inflation and
unemployment, and demand shocks as the difference between the two. I could only find inflation
data every five years, and the data that was available was fairly consistent across states. Thus, I
decided not to include inflation in my model. Unemployment is in my model, however, as there
is ample unemployment data by state. State GDP figures are available beginning in 1963; but
there is a discontinuity in the data at 1997, when the data switched from SIC industry definitions
to NAICS industry definitions.15 Because of this discontinuity, I use personal income instead of
GDP. Personal income, which has been tracked since the 1940s, is also a more accurate measure
of the functional wealth of a given person.
I follow Lindert and assume that there is a nonlinear relationship between economic
growth (personal income, in my model). By virtue of the data availability and the nature of
particular variables, I estimate the following regression equation:

PersonalIncGrowth  B0  B1 PersonalIncLag  B2 SSpending B3 SSpending2  B4 SSpending3
 B5Unemployment  B6UnivEnrollment  B7 Log (GrossInv)  B8 Log (GrossInvLag )  u

where the dependent variable is the growth of personal income, Sspending is per capita social
spending in nominal U.S. dollars, Unemployment is the state unemployment rate,
UnivEnrollment is the percentage of a given state’s population that is enrolled at a four-year

The BEA website notes, “The NAICS-based statistics of GDP by state are consistent with U.S. gross domestic
product (GDP) while the SIC-based statistics of GDP by state are consistent with U.S. gross domestic income
(GDI). With the comprehensive revision of June 2014, the NAICS-based statistics of GDP by state incorporated
significant improvements to more accurately portray the state economies. Two such improvements were recognizing
research and development expenditures as capital and the capitalization of entertainment, literary, and other artistic
originals. These improvements have not been incorporated in the SIC-based statistics. In addition, there are
differences in source data and different estimation methodologies. This data discontinuity may affect both the levels
and the growth rates of GDP by state. Users of GDP by state are strongly cautioned against appending the two data
series in an attempt to construct a single time series for 1963 to 2013.”
15
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college or university, and GrossInv is a state’s gross investment. The two lagged variables are
data from ten years earlier. I included, but did not list for obvious spatial constraints, 49 dummy
variables to account for idiosyncrasies across states. Finally, u is the error term of the population
model.
This paper considers the period from 1990 to 2007 for two main reasons. First, this
period is known as the Great Moderation because there were relatively few major shocks in the
international economy. Second, I lack the data to examine an earlier time period. Annual
university enrollment rates only date back to 1990. Before then, they were collected every five
years. I measure seven variables for all fifty states over a 17-year period, which provides me with
5,950 observations.
Table 1 contains summary statistics for each variable in my model.

Variable
Personal Income Growth

Table 1
Mean
Std. Dev.

Min

Max

4.4%

2.5%

̶ 11%

36%

$17,006.80

$5,220.02

$7,017.06

$35,734.78

$2,037.43

$1,088.88

$689.95

$5682.29

Unemployment Rate

5.1%

1.4%

2%

11%

University Enrollment Rate

5.6%

0.9%

4%

10%

̶ $524.21

$165,958.50

̶ $1,534.09

$105,442.00

Personal Income Lag
Social Spending per Capita

Gross Investment
Gross Investment Lag

$13,214.48 $19,104.45
$8,694.68

$12,041.56

The ranges and values for each variable are realistic. The mean annual growth in personal
income from 1990 to 2007 was 4.4 percent. There are two outliers in the data for personal
income growth: Louisiana in 2005 (-11 percent) and Louisiana in 2006 (36 percent). Hurricane
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Katrina is responsible for these atypical values. It struck Louisiana’s coastline in 2005, and the
resulting recovery is seen in the 2006 data. The four highest unemployment rates belong to West
Virginia in the early 1990s. It was during this period that the coal miners went on strike, which
severely decreased coal output and employment.16 The mean university enrollment rate during
this period was 5.6 percent. The highest university enrollment rate was 9.8 percent posted by
Arizona in 2007. Arizona is home to the highest-attended on-campus university in the country
(Arizona State University) and has two of the most popular online universities (University of
Phoenix and Grand Canyon University). 17 Arkansas recorded the lowest university enrollment
rate at 3.9 percent.
Over this time period, the mean social spending per capita was $2,037.43 per year. The
state with the lowest social spending per capita was Florida in 1990, while the highest was
Alabama in 2004. National social spending per capita rose each year in the period. The same
cannot be said of national personal income growth, which although positive for every year, was
fairly inconsistent.

4. Empirical Testing and Results

My primary hypothesis is that Log(Social Spending) has no effect on the growth of
personal income – that is, that its coefficient is equal to zero. The Breusch-Pagan test indicated
that my model was guilty of heteroskedasticity, so I ran a GLS regression. I also corrected for

16
17

Ronald Smothers, “Union Prepares for Long Strike at Coal Mines.” New York Times, February 6, 1993.
U.S. Department of Education (USDE). January 1, 2015. Accessed January 14, 2015. http://www.ed.gov/.
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potential endogeneity by running a two-stage least squares in conjunction with the GLS
regression. The results for this regression are included in Table 2. I found that Sspeˆ
nding is
statistically insignificant; thus, there is not robust statistical evidence of a correlation between
social spending and growth of personal income. In addition, its small coefficient (  0.00003)
suggests that even if there did exist a statistically significant relationship between social
spending and personal income growth, it wouldn’t have many real-world consequences. In a
word, the relationship between the two variables lacks practical and economic significance. It
stipulates that a $100 change in social spending should correspond with just a 0.3 percentage
increase in person income growth. Note that this example makes use of a coefficient that is not
statistically significant, so one cannot assume a relationship of any kind in the first place.

Table 218

Dependent Variable: Growth of Per Capita Income
Variable

18

GLS Regression

Variable

GLS Regression

Log(PersonalIncLag)

- 0.12***

PersonalIncLag

- 0.02***

Sspeˆ
nding

- 0.00003

Sspeˆ
nding

0.00003

Sspe nˆding 2

8.16e-9

Sspe nˆding 2

3.3e-8

Sspe nˆding 3

- 1.25e-12

Sspe nˆding 3

3e-12

Unemployment

- 0.48***

Unemployment

- 0.38****

UnivEnrollment

0.36

UnivEnrollment

- 0.86*

Log(GrossInv)

0.02***

GrossInv

8.9e-7***

Log(GrossInvLag)

0.004

GrossInvLag

- 6.04e-7*

Note that one star indicates significance at the 10% level, two at the 5% level, and three at the 1% level. The R 2
for all regressions were between 0.09 and 0.11.
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Furthermore, I found that the unemployment rate has a significant negative effect on
growth of personal income. A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is
expected to decrease personal income growth by almost a half a percentage point, according to
the first regression in Table 2. The university enrollment rate has no discernable effect on
personal income growth. Capital investment has a positive impact on personal income growth,
but the lagged investment variable appears to be uncorrelated with personal income growth.
These findings agree with traditional neoclassical growth models, which frequently use factors
like employment and capital to explain economic growth.19

5. Empirical Conclusions

My statistical analysis verified what neoclassical growth theory says about the
determinants of economic growth, namely, that capital investment positively affects growth and
unemployment negatively affects it. My findings also accord with those of Lindert. After
attacking the problem from multiple angles, I discovered no economically meaningful or
statistically significant relationship between social spending and personal income growth. This
finding is important because state governments could be investing more in their citizens at no
cost to mean personal income. As mentioned in the introduction, there are many social
institutions for which the optimal level of consumption is higher than the outcome that the

“Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention” by Kenneth Arrow (1962) talks about the
importance of invention and research and development programs. Another 1962 paper by Arrow, “The Economic
Implications of Learning by Doing,” allows for changes in the efficient capital-labor ratio by assuming that
individuals can become more productive over time through experience and education. These two papers, and others,
inspired neoclassical models augmented with human capital like Mankiw et al (1992), and endogenous growth
theory beginning with David Romer in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
19
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efficient market delivers. Governments should invest in these causes without fear of stunting the
growth of society as a whole.

Part II

Is there a moral obligation to redistribute wealth via social spending?

U.S. state social spending has no effect on economic growth, but this fact does not entail
society ought to redistribute wealth. To determine whether there is an obligation to redistribute
wealth, it is necessary to ask a more specific question: Do individuals have an obligation to help
the less fortunate? I will now consider three responses to this question: Robert Nozick, John
Rawls, and Catholic social teaching. First, I will explain the views and arguments of the
perspectives. Second, I will analyze them, providing comments and critiques they may have of
the others. Third, I will connect their philosophies with my findings on social spending and
economic growth. Finally, I will offer my own response to the question.

Robert Nozick

Robert Nozick (1938 – 2002) was an American philosopher and Harvard professor in the
second half of the twentieth century. His book Anarchy, State, and Utopia, published in 1974,
had a profound impact on the study of political philosophy. In many ways, Anarchy, State, and
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Utopia is a critique of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, though, in addition, it contributed much
to the discipline of philosophy.
Nozick was influenced deeply by the work of John Locke. His theory utilizes Locke’s
notions of the state of nature and the law of nature. Locke defines the state of nature as the
hypothetical condition wherein “men are perfectly free to order their actions, and dispose of their
possessions, in any way they like, without asking anyone’s permission—subject only to the
limits set by the law of nature”.20 The law of nature states that no one may harm another in “life,
liberty, health, or possessions”.21 Following Locke, Nozick begins by assuming that individuals
have rights in the state of nature guaranteed to them by the law of nature. The obligations the law
of nature entails are negative: they morally bind individuals to not behave in certain ways.
Therefore, in Nozick’s eyes, individuals do not have an obligation to help others in any positive
way. Eventually, he argues that a state which redistributes wealth to assist those in need is
morally impermissible, as the taxation used to finance the redistribution infringes upon a
person’s right to his earnings. Hence, Nozick would say there exists no moral obligation to help
the less fortunate.
In the state of nature, there will inevitably be instances where people have their rights
violated. Nozick says people are morally permitted to defend themselves and enforce their rights
against assailants. They even may demand compensation and exact punishment as far as “calm
reason and conscience dictate”.22 Not everyone has the strength or the means to adequately
defend themselves, however, so individuals have the incentive to come together to form mutualprotective associations. Mutual-protection associations are charged with defending and enforcing

Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, chapter 2.
Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, as quoted in Nozick 1974, 10
22
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 10c
20
21
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the rights of their members, and to settle disputes between members. These associations would
presumably work well until there are problems between groups and within groups.23 Which
members of the association will answer the call to safeguard justice when an individual’s rights
are violated? And how does an association determine if someone violated another’s rights? To
sufficiently defend its members, mutual protective associations will hire a police force, and it
will appoint court justices to settle cases of injustice. Eventually market forces will cause the
collection of associations in a geographic area to consolidate into a confederation of dominant
firms.24 The confederation is a sort of state whose prime responsibility is to defend its members,
as they become unable to do so themselves while abiding by the law. Nozick calls this the
minimal state, or the smallest state that can be justified given the inviolability of individual
rights. Citizens may be charged (taxed) for their protection, but the tax is acceptable if and only
if it does not exceed the money they would have spent protecting themselves without the
intervention of the state.
Central to Nozick’s work is what he calls entitlement theory.25 Entitlement theory states
that individuals have the right (the entitlement) to possess goods which they have obtained justly.
There are two ways to justly obtain something according to Nozick. First, one may acquire from
nature something that was not previously owned. Nozick calls the procedure governing the just
acquisition of goods justice in acquisition. Second, one may receive through trade or by gift
something from another person, provided two conditions are met, namely, the transfer was
voluntary and the goods that were exchanged were justly acquired by the persons involved in the
trade. Nozick names the principle detailing just transactions justice in transfer. Finally, Nozick

23

Ibid, 12c.
Ibid 16-17
25
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 150.
24
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says people may come to possess something through unjust acquisition or transfer. The
resolution of these injustices is called the rectification of injustice. As will be seen, these three
principles are at the center of Nozick’s teachings on distributive justice.
In addition to the right to possess things they have justly acquired, Nozick argues that
people have the right to self-possession. Therefore, people are obligated to respect the fact that
they do not own others (unless one voluntarily submits to being owned by another), and hence it
is immoral to use or coerce them into doing something without their consent. Thus, for Nozick, it
is morally illegitimate to enforce most taxes, as the government is using the fruits of an
individual’s labor regardless of whether or not she approves of it.
Though Nozick certainly would say that it is important to have a just distribution of
goods among people, he would disagree with most forms of redistribution. From his perspective,
the justice of a distribution is necessarily tied to history.26 Whether or not a given distribution is
just depends upon how individuals arrived at that distribution, that is, upon whether those
individuals acquired and transferred their goods justly. If a group moves from one just
distribution to a second distribution by just acquisitions and transfers, then Nozick contends that
the second distribution must be just as well, regardless of how unequal it may seem. To illustrate
his claim, he uses the example of then NBA star Wilt Chamberlain.27 Pretend that people have an
equal share of wealth or the distribution of wealth is just in some definable way. Also suppose
that Chamberlain specified in his contract that he will only play if each person in attendance pays
twenty-five cents to see him, in addition to the price of the game ticket. At the end of the season,
assuming a total of one million tickets were bought, Chamberlain will have gained $250,000 in
ticket revenue. Nozick claims, assuming that all other transfers were voluntary and that all
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acquisitions were just, this second distribution is just too, even if Chamberlain’s wealth is
disproportionate to that of everyone else, and the reason is that everyone who paid (gifted)
Chamberlain the twenty-five cent surcharge did so voluntarily.
Nozick doesn’t explain in detail how injustices in acquisition and transfer would be
rectified. He says that, given an injustice, a principle that dictates rectification would refer to
history and decide how different the present holdings are compared to how they would have been
had the injustice not occurred.28 The difference, then, would be paid to the victims of the
injustices. He does not discuss how the value of goods is decided, who is compensated if the
victims are deceased, or who reimburses the victims if the transgressor is deceased.
In sum, Nozick assumes that individuals have rights to life, liberty, health and possession
as guaranteed by the law of nature. Nozick acknowledges that, because of these rights,
individuals have certain obligations, but these obligations are negative in nature: people must not
infringe upon the liberty and possessions of another. Therefore, a person has no moral obligation
to help the less fortunate, or anyone for that matter. Furthermore, Nozick believes that most cases
of redistribution are unjust. History plays an important role in the justice of a particular
distribution: all that matters, given a just starting place, is how a group of individuals arrived at
its current distribution. To adjudicate disputes and protect its populace, a minimal state
inevitably arises out of anarchy. This state, Nozick claims, is legitimate because it doesn’t violate
the law of nature.
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John Rawls

John Rawls (1921 – 2002) was a Harvard professor and one of the preeminent American
political philosophers of the twentieth century. Rawls’ main work, A Theory of Justice (1971),
was praised as the most important book in the field of political philosophy since On Liberty by
John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century. For Rawls, justice is closely tied to the nature of
institutions, which are public systems of rules that specify offices and positions with their rights,
duties, powers, immunities and the like. The basic structure of these institutions—that is, the way
they distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the relative distribution of
advantages resulting from social cooperation—is the primary subject of justice.
Before considering the structure of society, Rawls’s separates the right from the good.
Because the good is defined as the satisfaction of rational desire, Rawls believes there is no hope
for people to agree on what is good—they will never reach a consensus on questions like
whether or not Justin Bieber actually is a talented performer, and there is no need to agree on
such things. Yet he does think that people can agree on what is right and says debate of the good
should be postponed until individuals have agreed on the right. Individuals, however, can only
agree on the right if they forget their biases.
Rawls invites people to imagine they are in the position of free and equal persons who
commit themselves to inventing the principles which govern the right, which secure justice.
These persons are behind a “veil of ignorance,” meaning they aren’t aware of their talents,
intelligence, strength, political beliefs, financial endowments, and behavioral tendencies.29 Rawls
calls this state of ignorance the original position, and assumes that those in it are rational and
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mutually disinterested in the lives of others. Of course, he isn’t supposing that people actually
meet and decide things in this matter. Instead, the original position is a thought experiment used
to “make vivid to ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for
principles of justice, and therefore on the principles themselves”.30 Rawls thinks that the original
position thought experiment is compelling because discussions of justice often break down due
to biases (e.g. peoples’ inability to set aside their own political ideologies, relative position in
society, and talents). In the original position, each person is still seeking a society that secures for
himself the greatest number of liberties and the highest economic floor possible, but is
theoretically free from his biases. So how would bias-free, rational individuals structure society
so as to bring about the greatest amount of liberty and the highest expected personal economic
payout?
Rawls argues that in the original position, rational individuals would choose two essential
principles of justice.31 First, each person in society should have equal right to the greatest
scheme of liberties possible, consistent with the same liberties afforded to others. Therefore, in a
just society, each member would have access to political liberties such as the right to vote, the
right to hold public office, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and so on, so that the
greatest number of equal liberties will be achieved for everyone. Second, socioeconomic
inequalities should be arranged so that they are to everyone’s advantage and attached to
positions and offices open to all. This principle expresses two important ideas. The first idea is
related to what is meant by “to everyone’s advantage.” In the original position, individuals don’t
know their relative economic status in society, and therefore would not agree to any society
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where inequality could leave them destitute. So, any inequality that does exist should make the
worst-off group better off than it would be in an entirely equal society. The idea that inequality is
just if and only if it advantages those least well off is called the difference principle.32
The second idea focuses on what it means to have “positions and offices open to all.”
Rawls is worried that if positions were open to individuals based on talent alone, an individual
with a poor upbringing would be disadvantaged compared to someone with a privileged
upbringing, even if they had similar levels of ability and motivation. He argues that a just society
would compensate for this disparity—through things like child tax credits, school lunch
programs, and better public schools-—so that persons endowed with comparable abilities and
energy to exercise them should have the same life chances. Rawls also believes that those left out
are debarred from realizing the tremendous fulfillment that results from the employment of one’s
natural and crafted talents.33 Social class should say nothing about one’s ability to succeed.
Rawls finds unjust any institution that precludes individuals from the possibility of obtaining a
particular position on the basis of social class, even if that institution makes those excluded better
off. The idea that equally talented and motivated individuals should have equal life chances is
known as fair equality of opportunity.
Of the two primary principles of justice, the first, which secures basic liberties, ranks
lexically ahead of the second, the one that specifies fair equality of opportunity and the
difference principle. That is, liberties should not be traded for increased wealth or social position.
Thus, for example, Lee Kuan Yew’s suppression of democratic rights to obtain economic
prosperity during his reign as prime minister of Singapore from 1959-2011 was unjust by Rawls
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standards.34 Moreover, the distribution of wealth, income, and social positions must be consistent
with the basic liberties enumerated by the first principle and with the notion of fair equality of
opportunity.35
In addition to requirements for society, Rawls lays out principles for individuals, which
he calls natural duties.36 Natural duties share no necessary connection with institutions, and
Rawls prescribes duties which are both positive and negative. An example of a positive duty is
the duty of mutual aid. This precept demands that people do good for one another if it doesn’t
come at a significant cost to them. Stronger than this is the duty one has to refrain from harming
or injuring another, and, in instances that require it, not exacting unnecessary suffering. The
fundamental natural duty, Rawls says, is the duty of justice. Everyone is required to comply with
and support just institutions, and when these are in place, each person must do his or her part to
maintain the existing scheme.37
The original position is the first of four stages in creating and applying just principles to
society. After individuals in the original position have made the principles of justice, they enter
into the second stage, the constitutional convention.38 They must now choose a just constitution
that reflects the principles of justice and defines the basic rights of citizens. The veil ignorance is
partly removed at this point: they are now aware of basic facts about their society, such as its
political culture and economic status, but are still not cognizant of their own position in society.
Next, individuals enter the legislative stage.39 They veil of ignorance now only shrouds the
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particulars about themselves, as good representative legislators remain unbiased. The goal at this
stage is to enact just laws and policies. Just laws and policies secure fundamental liberties for
citizens and maximize the long-term expectations of the least well-off group. Finally, the
individuals enter the fourth stage, the application of rules, where they enforce in specific
instances the laws they put in place. Here, everyone has complete access to information; they
know about themselves, others, and society.
Rawls recognizes that, after this fourth stage, people might experience dissonance
between what they sense to be just and what they have put in place. If people perceive an
injustice, Rawls says they can always reenter the original position and alter the theoretical
structure of society till they arrive at what he calls a reflective equilibrium, where the people’s
sense of justice matches what they have contrived in the original position.40 The reflective
equilibrium is an important idea, because societies, as well as humans, are always changing.
Heraclitus famously remarked, “You cannot step in the same river twice”.41 People are always
liable to reevaluate their thoughts when some new particular case arises.42
Rawls argues that a minimum income—or what he calls the social minimum—ought to
be part of the legislation of a just society.43 The value of the social minimum should be set to the
value that maximizes the expectation of the least well-off group, and should be funded by
transfers. The social minimum ensures that the difference principle is upheld.
Rawls believes that a just society follows two fundamental principles. First, it secures the
most extensive scheme of liberties for each member of society. Second, society keeps positions
open to all, regardless of social class or any demographic factor and doesn’t permit inequality
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unless that inequality improves the expected outcome of the least well-off group. Society has an
obligation to help the less fortunate in two ways. First, it should ensure that those with equal
talents and enthusiasm have equal prospects at success. And second, it should uphold the
difference principle by offering the social minimum through transfers.

Catholic social teaching44

There are many voices in the Catholic tradition. The writers of scripture, the early church
fathers, medieval theologians like Thomas Aquinas, and popes all have their own narrative, their
own attempt to articulate their beliefs of God and morality. One must consider these voices
independently before understanding the Catholic Church’s harmonic response to whether there is
a moral obligation to help the less fortunate.
The Catholic tradition in many ways begins with the Hebrew Scriptures. The book of
Genesis contains two important truths about a life of faith. First, the world is good, including the
physical world. In the first creation story, God, following each day of creation, looked upon what
was created and “saw that it was good” (Gen 1:1-31).45 The material world that humans inhabit
was created by God and therefore has religious significance. Humans are good too, since they are
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part of creation and are made in God’s image and likeness.46 This understanding of creation
serves as the basis of many Catholic moral teachings on topics like dignity, rights, and duties,
which will be discussed later.
The second truth is that the world God created is a gift to humanity for its use. So while
humanity’s existence is fortunate, it is not fortuitous: God created a good world and gifted it for a
reason. The physical world is meant to fulfill the needs of humanity.47 For this reason, the writers
of the Hebrew Scriptures in numerous sections call people to support those that struggle to have
their needs met. In Exodus, one learns never to “mistreat or oppress a foreigner,” while
Deuteronomy lauds the one who “executes justice for the orphan and the widow, and who loves
strangers, providing them with food and clothing” (Deuteronomy 10:18). The authors of
scripture recognized that foreigners, orphans, and widows have difficulty obtaining life’s
necessities. In these writers’ eyes, justice is served when society cooperates in such a way that
the needs of all are fulfilled, and therefore society does have an obligation to help those with
unmet needs.
The fathers of the early church (simply called “The Fathers”) adopted this view as well.
Ambrose of Milan wrote in On Naboth, “When giving to the poor man, you are not giving him
what is yours; rather you are paying back to him what is his.”48 Material objects ultimately
belong to those who are in need of them, and humans are obliged to facilitate the flow of
resources from areas of abundance to areas of dearth. The Fathers, however, also provided an
additional argument for giving. They argued that giving was not only just but was also essential
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for the moral development and salvation of the giver. The rich had the incentive to give in order
to prove to themselves they weren’t avaricious and, as it were, to earn their ticket to paradise.
Although the things of the earth should be used to meet the needs of humans, The Fathers
believed that property ownership was a useful human invention.49 But property ownership, as
something invented by humans, was subservient to God’s purpose for creation. Property
ownership, therefore, was acceptable as long as the wealthy shared their surplus with the lowly. 50
Thomas Aquinas endorsed property ownership for reasons of usefulness as well. People
are more apt to buy or produce things if they are able to own them. Moreover, people tend to
care for their personal possessions more than they would for commonly owned items.51 Here
Aquinas anticipates a version of the Tragedy of the Commons. In a world where everything is
commonly owned, individuals, through rational action, might act contrary to what is best for the
group as a whole. This same logic also explains why a typical college fraternity is messy.
Finally, Aquinas backs private property because it eliminates most disputes over who is
permitted to use certain objects.52
Aquinas adopted The Fathers’ understanding of the purpose of an object and took it a
step further.53 In his eyes, the telos or end of an object is built into it by natural law.54 Therefore,
natural law dictates that people are obligated to use objects according to their purpose, or to
fulfill the intention of the object which God ultimately decided. In the case of food and materials
that are necessary to life, people are morally bound to share their surplus with those in need. In
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cases of dire and urgent need, for which there are no other remedies and for which death is the
only alternative, Aquinas even says that it is morally permissible to take what you need from
others, according to the natural law embedded in the goods.55 It is important to note the rarity of
this circumstance. Aquinas endorses property rights, a belief that would be inconsistent with
people’s simply taking out of want or eventual need.
Recent popes have echoed key ideas of the tradition. Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum and
John Paul II’s Centesimus Annus reiterated that the right to own property is an important part of
economic life, but that it is not an absolute right and people are obligated to share their excess
goods with people who need them. Furthermore, these two encyclicals affirmed what the
Catholic Church recognizes as the universal destination of goods, the idea that God gave the
earth to humanity so that each person may have equal access to the sustenance that it provides.56
Even in today’s complex society, the economy ought to be set up in a way that meets the needs
of everyone. In Centesimus Annus, Pope John Paul II writes, “The obligation to earn one’s bread
by the sweat of one’s brow also presumes the right to do so”.57 In his eyes, society must be
organized to ensure that people, if they work hard, will be able to prosper and meet all of their
needs, including the fulfillment that comes from hard work. This is possible only if people are
granted a high enough wage. Thus, John Paul II argues that employers have the duty to pay
others appropriately for the work that they do. This conclusion does not resonate with the freemarket economic thinking that prevails today, wherefore John Paul II says, “there are many
human needs which find no place on the market,” but “it is a strict duty of justice and truth not to
allow fundamental human needs to remain unsatisfied.”58 Even if the market doesn’t dictate a
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just wage, it is incumbent upon those who do make an ample wage to meet the poor’s needs,
which also include the opportunity to acquire skills to be a productive member of society.
Prior to Rerum Novarum, discussion of human rights hadn’t entered into papal language.
This and subsequent encyclicals, however, taught that individuals had basic rights to go along
with their duties. Every person, rich or poor, religious or not, has rights and duties. In 1963, John
XXIII published the encyclical Pacem in Terris, which contained a comprehensive list of human
rights. The list is seen in Figure 2 below. The rights John XXIII outlines cover many aspects of
life, from the right to basic education to just wages and working conditions. According to John
XXIII, every right has a corresponding duty.59 Thus, while individuals have a right to security in
cases of unemployment, widowhood, old age, and other external factors, they also have a parallel
duty to insure others against them too. Consequently, the Catholic Church would say that society
does have an obligation to help the less fortunate.
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Figure 260

In essence, the Catholic Church argues that since God gave humans the earth to meet
their needs, it is everyone’s duty to ensure this happens. The most fundamental need is life. All
who are alive have dignity, and society must respect it using materials and goods for the purpose
for which they were intended: to sustain every person.
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Analysis

This section will compare and contrast the perspectives with one another. It considers one
source at a time, beginning with Nozick and ending with the Catholic Church, and analyzes them
with respect to the other two.

Nozick vs. Rawls and Catholic social teaching

Nozick and the Rawls disagree on whether there is a moral obligation to help the less
fortunate. Nozick, of course, believes that individuals only have negative obligations, that is, that
they shouldn’t harm another’s person or property. Rawls, on the other hand, believes that
individuals do have an obligation to help the impoverished, and this obligation is rooted in the
principles of justice conceived in the original position. Moreover, Rawls argues that individuals
have a duty independent of institutions to be good to those around them. Although there is some
overlap between the negative obligations dictated by the law of nature with Nozick and Rawls’s
natural duties (e.g. do not be cruel to others), any suggestion of an obligation to help others is
completely absent from Nozick’s writing.
Nozick also disagrees with Rawls on how involved a state can be. Rawls’s theory
justifies a state large enough to ensure that his two principles of justice are met: 1) it secures as
many equal basic liberties for each person as possible; and 2) it permits economic inequality only
if it benefits the least well-off group and keeps positions open to all on the basis of fair equality
of opportunity. But Nozick’s state is limited to what voluntary protective associations can do.
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Thus, there is no redistribution of wealth or focus on ensuring that people with equal abilities and
energies have the same life chances. Nozick does agree with Rawls, however, that the state is
charged with the duty of protecting others and their property from people both inside and outside
the state. The minimal state retains a monopoly on the use of force and may decide who may use
it and when it may be used.61
Nozick is critical of the way Rawls neglects history when determining whether one has
an obligation to help the less fortunate.62 Rawls is concerned about the status of the lowest
socioeconomic group and its wealth vis-à-vis the other classes. Nozick wonders whether some
individuals in that group did something deserving of that lower share.63 He argues that end-result
principles, like the ones Rawls adopts, only look at the final or present state of the distribution
and hence are too myopic. They should refer to history, for whether people justly acquired what
they own is the primary question of distributive justice, according to Nozick. As the Wilt
Chamberlain example illustrated, movement from one just distribution to another distribution by
just acquisition and transfers must also be just, even if one person has significantly more wealth
than everyone else.
A point Rawls and Nozick share is the inviolability of human rights. They both believe
that no amount of expected gains can justify using someone to improve the collective good or
persecuting them for some end. For instance, Rawls and Nozick would not permit the suffering
of the child in Ursula Le Guin’s short story “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas”. 64 The
atrocious conditions in which the child lives are necessary for the greater good of the rest of the
inhabitants of Omelas. In a similar vein, Rawls, due to the lexical order of his two principles of
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justice, believes that liberties should not be sacrificed for an increase in expected economic
outcome or a higher social position (e.g. Lee Kuan Yew-esque tradeoffs are not permitted).
Though they disagree on many functions of the state, Rawls and Nozick agree that the state is the
inevitable result of the hypothetical state of nature, and that it has the responsibility to defend the
rights and possessions of its inhabitants. Beyond these two similarities, there isn’t much overlap
between Rawls’s and Nozick’s theories of justice.
Nozick and Catholic social teaching both assume that humans should be respected. For
Nozick, it’s related to the Kantian idea of treating humans as ends. For Catholic social teaching,
human dignity is rooted in the divinity found in humans, who are made in the image of God.
Nozick and Catholic social teaching endorse obligations such as “don’t steal from others,” “don’t
hurt others,” and “don’t use others for alternative gain”. Moreover, the foundation of these
obligations—humanity’s inherent dignity and rights—consists of rather strong assumptions.
Nozick doesn’t give a clear reason why humans have an obligation to respect others: it’s that
way because of the law of nature. Similarly, the Catholic Church simply supposes that a loving
God created humans, and therefore they have innate dignity. As the reader will see later, Rawls
is highly critical of the strong assumptions at the heart of Nozick’s and the Catholic Church’s
positions.
Nozick doesn’t support the multitude of duties that appear in Catholic social teaching. In
his eyes, there is no duty to help the others meet their needs—there isn’t even a duty to defend
another’s rights from violation (though Nozick says one has the right to defend another’s liberty
or possessions if one chooses). This is the primary reason Nozick disagrees with the Catholic
Church’s conclusion that there is a moral obligation to help the poor.
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Nozick and Catholic social teaching view property ownership differently. According to
Catholic social teaching, the primary purpose of a material good is to meet the needs of
humanity, and this doesn’t change if that good is owned by someone. Nozick’s theory doesn’t
recognize a purpose for material goods. If an individual justly acquired or received something,
then she is entitled to it, regardless of whether she intends to use it or whether others need it
more than she does. These same conclusions hold on a larger scale. For Nozick, a state may only
do what the law of nature permits it to do, that is, enforce and defend the rights of its members. It
is morally impermissible for the state to redistribute wealth, for it is immoral to take from people
that to which they are entitled. In Nozick’s eyes, taxation is an instance of forced labor, as it
requires people to work to afford the payment to the state.65 The only acceptable tax, Nozick
says, is a surcharge used to defend the state’s members from theft and harm.66 This tax, however,
must not exceed what individuals would spend for their own defense. On the contrary, Catholic
social teaching argues that, by virtue of the universal destination of goods, governments are
expected to do much more than merely defend their citizens.67 They have economic duties, like
promoting business and protecting against harmful monopolies. They also have political duties,
such as securing individuals’ right to life, the right to participate in the work of society, and the
freedom to practice religion and pursue truth. A particularly important duty of the state is to
insure people in cases of sickness, widowhood, old age, and unemployment through government
assistance.68
The Catholic Church’s view of a just distribution is what Nozick calls a patterned
distribution. A method of distribution is patterned if it varies along with some natural
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dimension.69 The Catholic Church argues that goods ought to be given to those in need; hence,
the redistribution it calls for is patterned according to individual need. Nozick rejects any
patterned form of distribution. Instead, the justice of a distribution depends on what individuals
are entitled to, and they are entitled to that which they have justly acquired.

Rawls vs. Nozick and Catholic social teaching

Rawls tries to make as few assumptions as possible, and the ones he does make are
relatively weak, so readers will find them easier to adopt.70 He invites people into the original
position, where they are unbiased, rational, and disinterested, and supposes that they will create
the two principles of justice which he conceived. Rawls thinks that the assumptions in Nozick’s
theory are too strong. It is a significant logical step for Nozick to assume, like Locke, that
individuals have rights by nature – and who’s to say that Locke is right to assume it in the first
place? There are many people who would not endorse Nozick’s theory on the basis of that
assumption, a fact which is problematic considering that his theory of entitlement and conception
of the minimal state are based on it. Rawls wants to offer a theory capable of convincing people
of what is just, instead of making strong assumptions which some might not uphold in today’s
pluralistic society.
One way Rawls appeals to a pluralistic society is by adhering to pure procedural justice,
which says that justice is achieved when a procedure is actualized. To more fully understand
pure procedural justice, it helps to compare it with the notions of perfect and imperfect
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procedural justice. Perfect procedural justice occurs when there is both an independent criterion
for what is just and a procedure that delivers the just outcome. Rawls illustrates perfect
procedural justice by considering a group of people who want to divide a cake among
themselves. The just outcome is that each person receives an equally-sized fraction of the cake,
while the procedure for delivering this outcome is having one person divide the cake and pick
last.71 Imperfect procedural justice occurs when an independent criterion for what is just exists,
but there is no procedure that delivers with certainty the desired outcome. An example is a
criminal court case. The just outcome is the defendant’s receiving an accurate verdict; yet, there
is no perfect way to ensure that this outcome will be reached. Finally, pure procedural justice
happens when there is no independent criterion for determining a just outcome, but there exists a
just procedure such that the outcome is always fair. The original position exemplifies pure
procedural justice: the outcome must be fair, because that’s what people decided was fair in the
original position. In some cases, however, the outcome might not match what people intuit as
just. If people perceive an injustice, they can always reenter the original position and alter the
theoretical structure of society till they arrive at a reflective equilibrium, where the people’s
sense of justice coincides with the principles of justice.72 While the conclusions of the theories of
Nozick and Catholic social teaching are weakened when their assumptions are questioned,
Rawls’s conclusions are at most altered and retain every bit of their original strength.
By virtue of the reflective equilibrium, if the current scheme of institutions isn’t
producing what people sense to be just, they simply make adjustments to that scheme. With
Nozick, when rectifying a rights violation, one has the right to punish the offender “so far as
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calm reason and conscience dictate” in accordance with the crime committed.73 However,
Nozick doesn’t explain in depth how to rectify injustices in acquisition or transfer. History is
replete with examples of such injustices. Practically every community of individuals has
committed at least one, and many of these have gone unresolved. The only solution to rectify the
enormity of injustice appears to be a mass redistribution, which is highly impractical. Besides, it
is impossible to recompense the dead. For Rawls, however, this same problem isn’t as prevalent.
In a well-ordered society, the orientation of institutions will ensure that injustices are made right.
According to Rawls and Catholic social teaching, people have positive as well as
negative duties. Both perspectives hold that individuals have a moral obligation to help the less
fortunate. They are especially concerned for the marginalized groups of society and agree that
the state has more responsibility than simply defending its populace. It too must ensure that
individuals retain a right to political liberties and a certain level of wealth. While Rawls doesn’t
provide a detailed list of natural rights and duties (although individuals in the original position
theoretically could) as John XXIII does in Pacem in Terris, he would agree with some of them
and the basic ideas behind many of them. He accedes that individuals have rights founded on
justice, like the right to life, the right to bodily integrity, and the freedom of assembly. Though
Rawls doesn’t explicitly use the same language as Catholic social teaching, he would certainly
believe that access to basic education and social insurance against injury, old age,
unemployment, etc. are vital to a well-ordered society.74
While Rawls and Catholic social teaching share some of the same conclusions, the logic
behind them is notably different. Individuals in Rawls’s theory of justice have their rights rooted
in the original position and his two principles of justice. Catholic social teaching makes strong
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assumptions from the outset. It assumes that people have dignity—and therefore rights—because
they are made in the image of God. It also assumes the universal destination of goods because
God gave the world to humans to meet their needs. God plays an important role in the Catholic
Church’s theory of justice. If one supposed that God did not exist, it wouldn’t make much sense
to say that people are made in the image of God, or that earth is a gift from God. Doubting God’s
existence weakens the resulting arguments about helping those in need. Rawls thinks that the
assumption of rational, disinterested people in the original position is part of a much more
convincing argument to reach the same conclusion of the existence of a moral obligation to help
the poor.

Catholic social teaching vs. Nozick and Rawls

While the natural law is an important idea for both Catholic social teaching and Nozick,
they disagree as to what sort of obligations the natural law entails. Whereas Nozick recognizes
only negative obligations, Catholic social teaching says that there is a corresponding duty for
each human right. Some rights, such as the right to basic necessities like food, clothing, and
shelter, or even rights to higher goods like access to education and insurance against
unemployment, cannot be met with negative duties. It is insufficient to say that the
corresponding duty to the right to nourishment is to make sure you don’t steal another’s food.
Catholic social teaching says individuals have the positive duty to ensure others are fed. This
point is illustrated clearly in the Epistle of James: “Suppose a brother or a sister is without
clothes and daily food. If one of you says to them, ‘Go in peace, keep warm and well fed,’ but
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does nothing about their physical needs, what good is it?” (James 2:15-16). Catholic social
teaching argues that one must do more than merely not interfere with others’ pursuit of their
needs, or hope they meet them. Everyone has an active duty to meet their needs, one which is
rooted the purpose of the fruits of the earth.
The universal destination of goods stands at odds with Nozick’s entitlement theory.
Catholic social teaching says it would be immoral for Wilt Chamberlain, to use a previous
example, to not share his wealth with those in need. Individuals are entitled to what they own
only conditionally: the duty to share with the needy is an essential part of the right to own
property, even if one acquired one’s wealth justly. Not only does the Catholic faith call for moral
activity like sharing with the poor, but it is in the best interest of the wealthy to share insofar as
they are concerned with eternal salvation.
Catholic social teaching is much less concerned than the other two perspectives with
detailing limitations or responsibilities of the government. While Centesimus Annus and other
papal documents delineate some key responsibilities and limitations of governments, the primary
concern is that every individual has rights acknowledged by Catholic social teaching. Thus, John
Paul II recommends what he calls “fraternal support,” a more localized, communal care that
encompasses emotional as well as pecuniary assistance. Catholic social teaching calls the notion
that needs ought to be met by the most localized authority the principle of subsidiarity.75
For Rawls, the state is an institution that is essential to justice. It creates, dictates, and
enforces the laws which secure freedoms for its people and help ensure relative social and
economic equality. By contrast, the Catholic Church puts more emphasis on individuals and the
natural world. As mentioned earlier, members of society have a right to life and its necessities
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and have a duty to ensure those rights are upheld for others. Moreover, people are obligated to
use the material world to help the poor because God intended material goods to be used for that
purpose—to meet the needs of others. Hence, even though it is important to both Rawls and the
Catholic Church to secure economic and political rights for people, the arguments they use in
support of their claim stand in stark contrast.
To conclude, both the Catholic Church and Rawls believe that individuals have an
obligation to help those in need. While the Catholic Church’s arguments focus on the individual
in community with others, Rawls centers on what individuals would choose in the Original
position. Nozick disagrees with the Catholic Church and Rawls’ conclusion on both an
individual level and a societal level. He eventually concludes that individuals aren’t obligated to
provide assistance to anyone, and a state which redistributes wealth isn’t justifiable.
Rawls’s argument relies on weaker assumptions than the Catholic Church and Nozick.
His theory is predicated on what individuals would choose in the original position. Regardless of
how they structure society, the outcome will be procedurally just. The Catholic Church and
Nozick, on the other hand, rely on assumptions of the existence of a good God and innate human
rights respectively to theorize on what is just. Rawls thinks that agreeing to these initial
assumptions is a big step, perhaps too big for most people.
Nozick believes that end-result principles, like those of Rawls, neglect an important facet
of the justice of distribution: history. In fact, he argues that it is the primary factor in determining
the justice of a given distribution. While Rawls and the Catholic Church would acknowledge that
history is relevant, they ultimately conclude that there is a moral obligation to redistribute
wealth, even if the distribution was brought about via just acquisitions and transfers.
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The essential difference between Nozick and Rawls and the Catholic Church is their
understanding of obligations. Nozick believes there are only negative obligations. But Rawls and
Catholic social teaching believe there is, at the very least, an additional obligation to aid others.
This notion of mutual aid is a key element in both Rawls’s and the Catholic Church’s argument
in support of helping the less fortunate.

Social Spending and the obligation to help the less fortunate

In the first part of this paper, I found that U.S. state social spending had no effect on
personal income growth. That said, should society continue to devote money to social spending?
Furthermore, this conclusion, as it was reached by examining one region over a fixed time
period, is subject to change. If there existed a negative relationship between social spending and
economic growth, should society still redistribute its wealth through social programs? What if
there were a positive relationship between the two? I’ll respond to these questions by referring to
the three perspectives described above.
Nozick believes that any social spending is morally impermissible. Social spending is
financed by taxes, and taxes are on par with forced labor, as individuals must sacrifice a certain
portion of their hours spent in labor to cover the cost of the tax.76 Nozick more generally argues
that individuals cannot be used in any way. They have rights guaranteed to them by the law of
nature, and among these are the rights to life, liberty, health, and possessions. The resulting
obligations entail people must preserve that which others have a right to, but are in no way

76

Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 169a.

Heitzig 46
obligated to assist them. Thus, a government cannot justify social spending in any of its forms,
even if social spending made everyone more economically well-off.
Rawls advocates a society where the rich can get ahead if and only if they bring the poor
with them. Social spending is a key apparatus society may use to redistribute wealth to ensure
the difference principle is upheld. Moreover, for positions and offices to be subject to fair
equality of opportunity, those with comparable competencies and motivation must have equal
life chances. Social spending is an important way to ensure that those who can’t afford private
education, those who are raised a broken home, or those who are afflicted by health problems,
will have the same life chances as those equally talented and motivated individuals who have
more favorable life circumstances. Therefore, a just society, according to Rawls, will invest in
social spending regardless of its impact on economic growth.
Catholic social teaching holds that God gave the earth to humanity to meet its needs. This
end is embedded in the material objects of the world. Consequently, people have a moral
obligation to fulfill the needs of those with whom they are in community. In addition, the
inherent dignity in every person affords her the right to higher necessities like access to a basic
education and insurance against debility, old age, and unemployment. Because these needs
mirror the most significant sources of social spending, the Catholic Church endorses social
spending, whatever its relationship with overall growth. It would also emphasize, by the
principle of subsidiarity, that redistribution be done locally to the greatest extent possible.
For these theories, the relationship between social spending and economic growth has no
bearing on whether or not a society ought to redistribute wealth. Nozick believes that any kind of
spending that is funded by taxation is immoral, even if it exponentially increases growth. Rawls
holds that society ought to redistribute wealth to support the least advantaged group and ensure
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that individuals of equal talent and enthusiasm have the same prospects of success. Finally, the
Catholic Church argues that people have an obligation to fulfill everyone’s needs because that’s
what God intended the material world to do.

A personal commentary on the theories presented

I find Rawls’s argument to be widely accessible. Anyone, irrespective of their religion,
political beliefs, or social standing, is disposed to support his theory and subsequent conclusions.
Nozick and Catholic social teaching make rather large assumptions that many find difficult to
swallow. But what if I accepted them with relative ease? That is, what if I believe in a law of a
nature that details obligations for humankind and what if I believe in a loving God who created
good people and a bountiful earth to meet their needs?
As it happens, I do believe these things. And these beliefs affect how I personally would
answer the question of whether there is a moral obligation to redistribute wealth. I accept
Nozick’s assumption of the law of nature. People have an obligation to not harm others. But I
don’t think that claim is sufficient. I believe people have a positive obligation to help others as
well. The inherent human dignity rooted in God’s love calls for more than nonintervention; it
calls for active participation in the duties stipulated by Catholic social teaching, like feeding the
hungry, clothing the naked, and sheltering the homeless. Moreover, individuals in the original
position would not endorse a society Nozick envisions. I agree with Rawls and Catholic social
teaching that positive obligations are an important component of justice.
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Positive obligations stand at odds with Nozick’s theory. If people have positive
obligations, a more extensive state is justifiable. Taxes that fund social spending are now morally
permissible, as such spending fulfills the obligation to help those in need. I support Catholic
social teaching’s notion of the universal destination of goods. Therefore, I cannot acknowledge
Nozick’s entitlement theory as just. People have a right to private property, but with great
property comes great responsibility: they should use their surplus to meet the needs of others.
Because I advocate positive obligations and uphold the universal destination of goods, I cannot
accept some of Nozick’s key ideas as just.
But just because taxes are permissible and just because people have an obligation to help
one another doesn’t mean that society has an obligation to spending money on social programs.
Here’s where Rawls is important. He shows that people in the original position would recognize
social spending as an obligation. The obligations entailed by the notion of fair equality of
opportunity and the difference principle require government to invest in social programs.
Initiatives that compensate for social disadvantages such as housing subsidies, public education,
and tax credits are financed through government spending. Furthermore, transfers are the
primary way governments provide a social minimum. Thus, because governments are obligated
to put programs in place to ensure fair equality of opportunity and a social minimum, and
because social spending is necessary to finance these programs, society is obligated to spend
money on social programs. Catholic social teaching convinces me that there is a duty to help
others, but Rawls convinces me that society has an obligation to redistribute wealth through
social spending.
In my eyes, the obligations to help others and spend money on social programs have very
few exceptions. I agree with Rawls that one should help another only if it doesn’t come at too
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great a cost. I don’t believe that sacrificing your life by pushing someone out of the way of a
moving train is obligatory, though such an action is extremely laudable. There may be exceptions
to social spending, but one of them is not related to its overall effect on the economy. I believe
that there is a moral obligation to redistribute wealth via social spending even if it is harmful to
the overall health of the economy. I side with Rawls that people in the original position would
reach this conclusion because redistribution will effect a more socially and economically
equitable society.

Final Conclusion

This paper sought to answer two questions. The first was “How does the level of social
spending in a given U.S. state affect the growth rate of personal income per capita?” To answer
this question, I used a regression model suggested by Lindert (2004). I found no statistical or
economically meaningful relationship between state social spending and personal income
growth, after correcting for endogeneity and heteroskedasticity.
The second question this paper attempted to answer was “Is there an obligation for
society to redistribute wealth through social spending?” I considered three responses to this
question, those of Robert Nozick, John Rawls, and the Catholic Church. After describing and
analyzing their views, I concluded that society is obligated to devote money to social programs,
even if there were shown to be a negative relationship between social spending and economic
growth. Ongoing policy debates should recognize the importance of social spending. It has farreaching effects in areas from education to health care. One thing it does not affect, however, is
the growth of personal income. Governments should fulfill their duty to invest in the social
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programs that have benefited, and will continue to benefit, its citizens without the fear that the
economy will shrink as a result.
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Appendix A: What about the level of personal income?

This paper focused primarily on the effect social spending has on the growth rate of
personal income. But what effect, if any, does social spending have on the level of personal
income? Although I won’t conduct any econometric test, I wanted to review a simple scatter plot
and look at the correlation between the two variables. A graph of the level of personal income
and social spending per capita is shown in Figure A1. Each data point reflects actual state values
for social spending and personal income between 1990 and 2007.

Figure A177
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There is a noticeable positive linear correlation between the level of personal income and
social spending per capita. In fact, the correlation coefficient between the two is 0.71, which
further suggests that there is a positive relationship between the two. Mathematically, this result
seems apparent given the findings in the paper. The change in personal income is simply the
derivative of the personal income at a specific time. Therefore, that the level of personal income
and social spending per capita might have a positive linear relationship should come as no
surprise. Yet future research could reveal a nonlinear relationship between the two variables. It
could also elucidate the true relationship between the two, after accounting for the additional
effects of other variables included in regression models like the ones considered in this paper.
Such models should anticipate endogeneity, as bigger economies are more likely to spend more
money (in absolute terms) on social programs than smaller economies. Figure A1 certainly
reflects the work of time: as states have grown wealthier, they have devoted more money on
social spending.
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